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Subordinated debt, market discipline, and bank risk
This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (subdebt thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. By reducing the chance that managers of distressed banks can take value-destroying actions to benefit themselves, subdebt regulation may encourage banks to lower asset risk. Moreover, subdebt regulation and bank capital requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks' moral hazard problems. To make subdebt regulation effective, regulators may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt, prohibit collusion between banks and subdebt investors, and require subdebt to convert into the issuing bank's equity when the government provides assistance to the bank. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT].Printed journal
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| JMCB4306 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | The Ohio State University., |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Banks Moral hazard studies Regulation of financial institutions Capital requirements |
| ISBN/ISSN | 222879 |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |