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Incumbents' defense strategies: a comparison of deterrence and shakeout strategy based on evolutionary game theory
This paper addresses the question of how an established firm can successfully defend its market against current and future competitors. Previous studies on this issue are surprisingly scarce and typically concentrate on only a single generic defense strategy. Thus, little is known about the degree and the manner in which different generic defense strategies, such as a deterrence strategy (pursued before competitor market entry) and a shakeout strategy (pursued after competitor market entry), differ in effectiveness and efficiency and about the corresponding role of product and market conditions. As these strategies tend to be costly, an established firm must decide which of these strategies to focus its scarce resources on. Drawing on evolutionary game theory and an empirical calibration and validation study, this paper seeks to fill these research gaps. While both strategies turn out to be viable options for market defense, the authors find that in general, a shakeout strategy tends to be superior to a deterrence strategy. However, the authors also identify product and market conditions under which an established firm is better off focusing on a deterrence strategy. In methodological respects, the paper contributes to the marketing discipline by introducing evolutionary game theory, which has not been used previously for analyzing marketing issues, as well as an evolutionary approach to research on market defense.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT].Printed journal
Call Number | Location | Available |
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JAMS4102 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
Penerbit | The Academy of Marketing Science., |
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Edisi | - |
Subjek | Marketing Competitive advantage Game theory studies |
ISBN/ISSN | 920703 |
Klasifikasi | - |
Deskripsi Fisik | - |
Info Detail Spesifik | - |
Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |