No image available for this title

Text

Do security analysts speak in two tongues?

Why do security analysts issue overly positive recommendations? We propose a novel approach to distinguish strategic motives (e.g., generating small-investor purchases and pleasing management) from nonstrategic motives (genuine overoptimism). We argue that nonstrategic distorters tend to issue both positive recommendations and optimistic forecasts, while strategic distorters ?speak in two tongues,? issuing overly positive recommendations but less optimistic forecasts. We show that the incidence of strategic distortion is large and systematically related to proxies for incentive misalignment. Our ?two-tongues metric? reveals strategic distortion beyond those indicators and provides a new tool for detecting incentives to distort that are hard to identify otherwise. .Printed Journal, baca ditempat

Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
TRFS2705PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana1
Penerbit The Society of Financial Studies.,
Edisi -
Subjek Communication
Investment banking
Venture capital
Learning
Belief
Search
Event studies
Rating agencies
Brokerage
Asymmetric and private information
Information and knowledge
Information and market efficiency
ISBN/ISSN 8939454
Klasifikasi -
Deskripsi Fisik -
Info Detail Spesifik -
Other Version/Related Tidak tersedia versi lain
Lampiran Berkas Tidak Ada Data