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Communication and Decision-Making in Corporate Boards
Time constraints, managerial power, and reputational concerns can impede board communication. This paper develops a model where board decisions depend on directors' effort in communicating their information to others. I show that directors communicate more effectively when pressure for conformity is stronger—that is, when directors are more reluctant to disagree with each other. Hence, open ballot voting can be optimal, even though it induces directors to disregard their information and conform their votes to others. I also show that communication can be more efficient when directors' preferences are more diverse. The analysis has implications for executive sessions, transparency, and committees.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| TRFS2705 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 27 No. 5, May 2014 |
| Subjek | Communication Acquisitions Corporate governance Mergers Elections Learning Belief Committees Associations seeking Search Social choice Restructuring Asymmetric and private information Information and knowledge Clubs Models of political processes: rent legislatures and voting behavior |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1465-7368 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 1614 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Review of Financial Studies |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |