Monitoring managers : does it matter?
We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards? information sets and decisions for a large sample of private equity?backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability. ?Soft? information plays a much larger role than hard data, such as the performance metrics that prior literature focuses on, and helps avoid firing a CEO for bad luck or in response to adverse external shocks. We show that governance reforms increase the effectiveness of board monitoring and establish a causal link between forced CEO turnover and performance improvements..Printed Journal, baca ditempat
Ketersediaan
Call Number | Location | Available |
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JOF6802 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
Penerbit |
Wiley Periodicals.,
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Edisi |
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Subjek |
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ISBN/ISSN |
221082 |
Klasifikasi |
- |
Deskripsi Fisik |
- |
Info Detail Spesifik |
- |
Other Version/Related |
Tidak tersedia versi lain |
Lampiran Berkas |
Tidak Ada Data
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