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The Labor Market for Bankers and Regulators
We propose a labor market model in which agents with heterogenous ability levels choose to work as bankers or as financial regulators. When workers extract intrinsic benefits from working in regulation (such as public-sector motivation or human capital accumulation), our model jointly predicts that bankers are, on average, more skilled than regulators and their compensation is more sensitive to performance. During financial booms, banks draw the best workers away from the regulatory sector and misbehavior increases. In a dynamic extension of our model, young regulators accumulate human capital and the best ones switch to banking in mid-career.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| RFS2709 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 27 No. 9, Sep 2014 |
| Subjek | Bankers labor market model regulators |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1465-7368 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 2840 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Review of Financial Studies |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |