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The Optimal Size of Hedge Funds: Conflict between Investors and Fund Managers
This study examines whether the standard compensation contract in the hedge fund industry aligns managers? incentives with investors? interests. I show empirically that managers? compensation increases when fund assets grow, even when diseconomies of scale in fund performance exist. Thus, managers? compensation is maximized at a much larger fund size than is optimal for fund performance. However, to avoid capital outflows, managers are also motivated to restrict fund growth to maintain style-average performance. Similarly, fund management firms have incentives to collect more capital for all funds under management, including their flagship funds, even at the expense of fund performance..Printed Journal
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| JOF 7104 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | The American Finance Association., |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | fund size funds under management |
| ISBN/ISSN | 221082 |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |