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Providing CEOs With Opportunities to Cheat : The Effects of Complexity-Based Information Asymmetries on Financial Reporting Fraud
Opportunities for financial reporting fraud arise because of information asymmetries—often labeled “lack of transparency”—between top managers and their diverse shareholders. We evaluate the relative contributions of information asymmetries arising from industry-level and firm-level complexities to the likelihood of top managers committing financial reporting fraud. Using a sample of 453 matched pairs of firms that have and have not been identified as having committed financial reporting fraud, we found that information asymmetries arising from industry- and firm-level complexities increase the likelihood of financial fraud. Moreover, more CEO stock options increase the likelihood of fraud when industry complexity is high, while aggressive monitoring by the audit committee reduces the likelihood of reporting fraud when firm-level complexity is high.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| JOM4106 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana (Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | United States: Sage Publication 2015 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 41 No. 6, Sep 2015 |
| Subjek | Agency theory Compensation Boards of directors bonuses and benefits |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1557-1211 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 1797 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | Journal of Management |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |