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Agency problems and the theory of the firm
The separation of security ownership and control is presented as an efficient form of economic organization. The presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense is set aside, along with the concept of the entrepreneur. The functions of management and risk bearing are treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces development of devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of the whole team and of individual members. Individual participants and managers face both the discipline and opportunities provided by markets for their services, both within and outside the firm.In any scenario where the weight of the wage revision process is at least equivalent to full ex post settling up, managerial incentive problems usually attributed to the separation of security ownership and control of the firm are resolved.Hardcopy
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| IM1510521 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | : The University of Chicago |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Management Economic theory Economic models Incentives Organization theory Ownership Risk aversion Wages & Salaries |
| ISBN/ISSN | - |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |