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Performance pay and top-management incentives
An analysis was conducted of performance pay and top-management incentives for over 2,000 chief executive officers (CEO) in 3 samples spanning 50 years. Estimates of the pay-performance relation, including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal, for CEOs indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. While the incentives generated by stock ownership are large relative to pay and dismissal incentives, most CEOs hold trivial fractions of their companies' stock, and ownership levels have declined during the past 50 years. Currently, median ownership for CEOs of large firms is 0.14%; at small firms, median ownership is 0.49%. Public and private political forces may impose constraints that reduce the pay-performance sensitivity. Declines in both the pay-performance relation and the level of CEO pay since the 1930s support this theory. It also is concluded that boards of directors do not vary the pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs with widely different inside stockholdings.Hardcopy
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| IM1510551 | PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana | 1 |
| Penerbit | : Foundations of Organizational Strategy |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Stock options Performance Statistical analysis Incentives Severance pay Executive compensation Wages & Salaries studies Shareholders wealth Stock purchase plans Chief executive |
| ISBN/ISSN | - |
| Klasifikasi | - |
| Deskripsi Fisik | - |
| Info Detail Spesifik | - |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |