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Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation : Operational, Governance, and Financial Engineering
Private equity funds intermediate investment and affect portfolio firm performance by actively engaging in operational, governance, and financial engineering. We study this type of intermediation in a dynamic agency model in which an active intermediary raises funds from outside investors and invests in a firm run by an agent. Optimal contracting addresses moral hazard at the intermediary and firm levels. The intermediary's incentives to affect firm performance are strongest after poor performance, while the agent's incentives are strongest after good performance. We also show how financial engineering, that is, financial contracting with outside investors, interacts with operational and governance engineering.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana (Koleksi Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | USA: The American Finance Association 2023 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Volume 78, Issue 5, October 2023, Pages 2779-2836 |
| Subjek | Investments Portfolio Financial engineering Governance Engineering |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1540-6261 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | First Published: 21 July 2023 |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Journal of Finance |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |