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Optimal Sequential Selling Mechanism and Deal Protections in Mergers and Acquisitions

Yi Chen - ; Zhe Wang - ;

We study the dynamic profit-maximizing selling mechanism in a merger and acquisitions (M&A) environment with costly bidder entry and without entry fees. Depending on the parameters, the optimal mechanism is implemented by a standard auction or by a two-stage procedure with exclusive offers to one bidder followed by an auction potentially favoring that bidder. The optimal mechanism may involve common deal protections like termination fees, asset lockups, or stock option lockups. Our proposed procedures resemble sales of targets filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy or M&A involving public targets, and they shed light on how to use deal protections in practice.


Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana (Koleksi Majalah)1
PenerbitUSA: The American Finance Association 2023
EdisiVolume 78, Issue 4, August 2023, Pages 2139-2188
SubjekMerger and Acquisitions
Bankcruptcy
ISBN/ISSN1540-6261
KlasifikasiNONE
Deskripsi FisikFirst Published: 05 May 2023
Info Detail SpesifikThe Journal of Finance
Other Version/RelatedTidak tersedia versi lain
Lampiran Berkas
  • https://remote-lib.ui.ac.id:2075/10.1111/jofi.13235

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