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Information Aggregation via Contracting
When a group of investors with dispersed private information jointly invest in a risky project, how should they divide the project's profit? We show that a simple contract dividing profits in proportion to investors' risk tolerances may facilitate information aggregation by altering investors' risk-taking incentives when they decide on how investment strategies respond to private information. Our results provide a contracting-based approach for information aggregation, which is an alternative to learning from endogenous market variables (e.g., prices) via contingent schedules as seen in well-known rational expectations equilibrium models.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana (Koleksi Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | USA: The American Finance Association 2023 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Volume 78, Issue 2, April 2023, Pages 935-965 |
| Subjek | Contracting out Market trading Information Aggregation |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1540-6261 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | First Published: 17 January 2023 |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Journal of Finance |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |