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The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements

Florian Hoffmann - ; Roman Inderts - ; Marcus Opp - ;

We analyze the effects of regulatory interference in compensation contracts, focusing on recent mandatory deferral and clawback requirements restricting incentive compensation of material risk-takers in the financial sector. Moderate deferral requirements have a robustly positive effect on risk-management effort only if the bank manager's outside option is sufficiently high; otherwise, their effectiveness depends on the dynamics of information arrival. Stringent deferral requirements unambiguously backfire. Our normative analysis characterizes whether and how deferral and clawback requirements should supplement capital regulation as part of the optimal policy mix.


Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana (Koleksi Majalah)1
PenerbitUSA: The American Finance Association 2022
EdisiVolume 77, Issue 4, August 2022, Pages 2423-2470
SubjekCompensation
Financial sector
Clawback Requirements
Regulatory Interference
ISBN/ISSN1540-6261
KlasifikasiNONE
Deskripsi FisikFirst published: 28 May 2022
Info Detail SpesifikThe Journal of Finance
Other Version/RelatedTidak tersedia versi lain
Lampiran Berkas
  • https://remote-lib.ui.ac.id:2075/10.1111/jofi.13160

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