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Regulation of Charlatans in High-Skill Professions
We model a market for a skill in short supply and high demand, where the presence of charlatans (professionals who sell a service they do not deliver on) is an equilibrium outcome. In the model, reducing the number of charlatans through regulation lowers consumer surplus because of the resulting reduction in competition among producers. Producers can benefit from this reduction, potentially explaining the regulation we observe. The effect on total surplus depends on the type of regulation. We derive the factors that drive the cross-sectional variation in charlatans (regulation) across professions.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.dasar - Pascasarjana (Koleksi Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | USA The American Finance Association., 2022 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Volume 77, Issue 2, April 2022, Pages 1219-1258 |
| Subjek | Regulations Cross-sectional Variation |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1540-6261 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | First published: 06 February 2022 |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Journal of Finance |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |
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