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Prestige, Promotion, and Pay
We develop a theory in which financial (and other professional services) firms design career structures to “sell” prestigious jobs to qualified candidates. Firms create less prestigious entry-level jobs, which serve as currency for employees to pay for the right to compete for the more prestigious jobs. In optimal career structures, entry-level employees (“associates”) compete for better-paid and more prestigious positions (“managing directors” or “partners”). The model provides new implications relating job prestige to compensation, employment, competition, and the size of the financial sector.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir (Koleksi Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | USA The American Finance Association., 2024 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Volume 79, Issue 1, February 2024, Pages 505-540 |
| Subjek | Financial industry Financial sector Financial Design |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1540-6261 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | ill, chart, table, grafik, 788 hal, 20 cm |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Journal of Finance |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |
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