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Information Cascades and Threshold Implementation : Theory and an Application to Crowdfunding

Lin William Cong - ; Yizhou Xiao - ;

Economic interactions often involve sequential actions, observational learning, and contingent project implementation. We incorporate all-or-nothing thresholds in a canonical model of information cascades. Early supporters effectively delegate their decisions to a “gatekeeper,” resulting in unidirectional cascades without herding on rejections. Project proposers can consequently charge higher prices. Proposal feasibility, project selection, and information aggregation all improve, even when agents can wait. Equilibrium outcomes depend on crowd size, and project implementation and information aggregation achieve efficiency in the large-crowd limit. Our key insights hold under thresholds in dollar amounts and alternative equilibrium selection, among other model extensions.


Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir (Koleksi Majalah)1
PenerbitUSA: The American Finance Association 2024
EdisiVolume 79, Issue 1, February 2024, Pages 579-629
SubjekCrowdfunding
Threshold
information cascades
ISBN/ISSN1540-6261
KlasifikasiNONE
Deskripsi Fisikill, chart, table, grafik, 788 hal, 20 cm
Info Detail SpesifikThe Journal of Finance
Other Version/RelatedTidak tersedia versi lain
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  • Information Cascades and Threshold Implementation: Theory and an Application to Crowdfunding

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