Tesis
Apakah subsidi asuransi kesehatan menyebabkan ex ante moral hazard? Analisis empiris intensitas merokok pada masyarakat miskin di Indonesia
The existence of ex ante moral hazard (EAMH) can cause inefficiency and threaten the sustainability of the health insurance program developed by the Indonesian government. The deficit in National Health Insurance (JKN) funds and the increase in the number of smokers in Indonesia can be an indication of the presence of EAMH. There are several studies related to EAMH, but the conclusions are still not conclusive regarding the existence of EAMH as an impact of health insurance ownership on individual smoking behavior. This study will use panel data provided by IFLS wave 2, 3, 4, and 5. By combining the matching and Difference-in-Differences (DiD) methods to eliminate various potential biases, this research aims to reveal the impact of participating in subsidized health insurance on changes in smoking intensity among beneficiaries of a government program that subsidizes health insurance premiums for individuals categorized as poor and near-poor (Askeskin). This research findings suggest that, overall, the Askeskin policy does not suggest the existence of EAMH (ex ante moral hazard) in relation to smoking behavior. Nevertheless, within a specific subset of the data, there are indications of EAMH linked to the rising smoking expenses among poor urban individuals.
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| T 598/23 | PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir | 1 |
| Penerbit | Jakarta: Program Studi Magister Perencanaan Ekonomi Dan Kebijakan Pembangunan Fakultas Ekonomi Dan Bisnis Uni 2023 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | - |
| Subjek | Universal health coverage Ex Ante Moral Hazard Askeskin DID Poor individual smoking behaviour |
| ISBN/ISSN | - |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | xii, 55 p. ; 30 cm |
| Info Detail Spesifik | Tesis |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas | Tidak Ada Data |