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UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
DOES SUBSIDIZED HEALTH
INSURANCE CAUSE EX ANTE
MORAL HAZARD? EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF SMOKING
INTENSITY IN POOR
COMMUNITIES...
TESIS
FAKULTAS EKONOMI DAN BISNIS
2023
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Tesis

Does Subsidized Health Insurance Cause Ex Ante Moral Hazard? Empirical Analysis of Smoking Intensity in Poor Communities in Indonesia

Rizki Wibias Anwar Maulida - ; Beta Yulianita Gitaharie (Penguji) - ; Rus'an Nasrudin (Pembimbing/Promotor) - ; Ninasapti Triaswati (Penguji) - ;

The existence of ex ante moral hazard (EAMH) can cause inefficiency and threaten the sustainability of the health insurance program developed by the Indonesian government. The deficit in National Health Insurance (JKN) funds and the increase in the number of smokers in Indonesia can be an indication of the presence of EAMH. There are several studies related to EAMH, but the conclusions are still not conclusive regarding the existence of EAMH as an impact of health insurance ownership on individual smoking behavior. This study will use panel data provided by IFLS wave 2, 3, 4, and 5. By combining the matching and Difference-in-Differences (DiD) methods to eliminate various potential biases, this research aims to reveal the impact of participating in subsidized health insurance on changes in smoking intensity among beneficiaries of a government program that subsidizes health insurance premiums for individuals categorized as poor and near-poor (Askeskin). This research findings suggest that, overall, the Askeskin policy does not suggest the existence of EAMH (ex ante moral hazard) in relation to smoking behavior. Nevertheless, within a specific subset of the data, there are indications of EAMH linked to the rising smoking expenses among poor urban individuals.


Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
T 598/23PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir1
PenerbitJakarta: Program Studi Magister Perencanaan Ekonomi Dan Kebijakan Pembangunan Fakultas Ekonomi Dan Bisnis Uni 2023
Edisi-
SubjekUniversal health coverage
Ex Ante Moral Hazard
Askeskin
DID
Poor individual smoking behaviour
ISBN/ISSN-
KlasifikasiNONE
Deskripsi Fisikxii, 55 p. ; 30 cm
Info Detail SpesifikTesis
Other Version/RelatedTidak tersedia versi lain
Lampiran BerkasTidak Ada Data

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