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Disclosing a Random Walk
We examine a dynamic disclosure model in which the value of a firm follows a random walk. Every period, with some probability, the manager learns the firm's value and decides whether to disclose it. The manager maximizes the market perception of the firm's value, which is based on disclosed information. In equilibrium, the manager follows a threshold strategy with thresholds below current prices. He sometimes reveals pessimistic information that reduces the market perception of the firm's value. He does so to reduce future market uncertainty, which is valuable even under risk-neutrality.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir (Koleksi Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | USA: The American Finance Association 2024 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Volume 79, Issue 2, April 2024, Pages 1123-1146 |
| Subjek | Future markets Market prices Dynamic Disclosure Model |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1540-6261 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | ill, chart, table, grafik, 924 hal, 20 cm |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Journal of Finance |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |