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Bailout Stigma
We develop a model of bailout stigma in which accepting a bailout signals a firm's balance-sheet weakness and reduces its funding prospects. To avoid stigma, high-quality firms withdraw from subsequent financing after receiving bailouts or refuse bailouts altogether to send a favorable signal. The former leads to a short-lived stimulation followed by a market freeze even worse than if there were no bailout. The latter revives the funding market, albeit with delay, to the level achievable without any stigma and implements a constrained optimal outcome. A menu of multiple bailout programs compounds bailout stigma and exacerbates the market freeze.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir (Koleksi Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | USA: The American Finance Association 2024 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Volume 79, Issue 5,Ocotber 2024, Pages 2993-3039 |
| Subjek | Government policy Financial crisiss Bailouts market freezes |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1540-6261 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | ill, chart, table, grafik, 772 hal, 20 cm |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Journal of Finance |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |