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Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship

Michael Ewens - ; Ramana Nanda - ; Christopher Stanton - ;

We show theoretically that a critical determinant of the attractiveness of venture capital (VC)-backed entrepreneurship for high-earning potential founders is the expected time to develop a startup's initial product. This is because founder-CEOs' cash compensation increases substantially after product development, alleviating the nondiversifiable risk that founders face at startup birth. Consistent with the model's predictions of where the supply of entrepreneurial talent is likely to be most constrained, we find that technological shocks differentially altering the expected time to product across industries can explain changes in both the rate of entry and characteristics of individuals selecting into VC-backed entrepreneurship.


Ketersediaan

Call NumberLocationAvailable
PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir (Koleksi Majalah)1
PenerbitUSA: The American Finance Association 2024
EdisiVolume 79, Issue 5,Ocotber 2024, Pages 3361-3405
SubjekEntrepreneurship
Venture capital
Compensation
CEO compensation
ISBN/ISSN1540-6261
KlasifikasiNONE
Deskripsi Fisikill, chart, table, grafik, 772 hal, 20 cm
Info Detail SpesifikThe Journal of Finance
Other Version/RelatedTidak tersedia versi lain
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  • Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship

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