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On the Magnification of Small Biases in Hiring
We analyze a setting in which a board must hire a chief executive officer (CEO) after exerting effort to learn about the quality of each candidate. Optimal effort is asymmetric, implying asymmetric likelihoods of each candidate being chosen. If the board has an infinitesimal bias in favor of one candidate, it allocates effort to maximize the likelihood of that candidate being chosen. Even when the board's prior is that its preferred candidate is inferior, she may still be chosen most often. A glass ceiling can also arise whereby the tendency to hire favored candidates increases as the importance of the position increases.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir (Koleksi Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | USA: The American Finance Association 2024 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Volume 79, Issue 5,October 2024, Pages 3623-3673 |
| Subjek | Organizations Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Candidates Hiring and Recruitment |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1540-6261 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | ill, chart, table, grafik, 772 hal, 20 cm |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Journal of Finance |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |