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Lying to Speak the Truth: Selective Manipulation and Improved Information Transmission
We analyze a principal-agent model in which an effort-averse agent can manipulate a publicly observable performance report. The principal cannot observe the agent's cost of effort, her effort choice, and whether she manipulated the report. An optimal contract links compensation to the realized output and the (possibly manipulated) report. Manipulation can be beneficial to the principal because it can make the report more informative about the agent's effort choice, thereby reducing the agent's information rent. This is achieved through a contract that incentivizes the agent to selectively engage in manipulation based on her effort choice.
Ketersediaan
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir (Koleksi Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | USA: The American Finance Association 2024 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Volume 79, Issue 6, December 2024, Pages 4303-4352 |
| Subjek | Financial reporting Manipulation Information Transmission Principal-agent model Performance report. |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1540-6261 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | ill, chart, table, grafik, 676 hal, 20 cm |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Journal of Finance |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |