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We investigate a seller's strategic choice between optimally structured negotiations with fewer bidders and an auction with more competing bidders when payments can have a contingent component, as is common in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), patent licensing, and employee compensation. The key factor favoring negotiations is that it allows the seller to set her preferred payment structure—that is, the revenue-maximizing mix of cash and contingent pay; reserve prices are of secondary importance. Negotiations are more likely to dominate if synergies increase in bidders' productivity types (as with acquirer-target complementarities in M&A). Higher dispersion and magnitude of bidders' private valuations also favor negotiations.
| Call Number | Location | Available |
|---|---|---|
| PSB lt.2 - Karya Akhir (Majalah) | 1 |
| Penerbit | United States: American Finance Association 2025 |
|---|---|
| Edisi | Vol. 80 Issue 3, Jun 2025 |
| Subjek | Auctions Negotiations Payment Structure |
| ISBN/ISSN | 1540-6261 |
| Klasifikasi | NONE |
| Deskripsi Fisik | 542 p. |
| Info Detail Spesifik | The Journal of Finance |
| Other Version/Related | Tidak tersedia versi lain |
| Lampiran Berkas |