Includes bibliographies and index
We examine the relationship between strategic change and CEO compensation by studying how a firm's refocusing program influences CEO compensation after completing the change. We contribute to the ?settling up? literature by arguing that strategic change is often uncertain for both the CEO and the board of directors responsible for executive compensation. As such the firm is likely to settle up …
We contribute to multiple agency theory by examining cases in which ventures making initial public offerings (IPOs) have managerial agents on their boards whose goals conflict with those of the investment bank agents hired to underwrite the stock. Underwriters have an incentive to underprice IPOs to maintain strong ties with institutional investors. We develop theory on agent differences based …
The authors examine how managers select between corporate restructuring implementation alternatives and how those decisions influence the profitability of the restructuring event. They argue that managers and owners have information asymmetries with respect to the assets in the restructuring and the restructured firms' diversification strategy, and that managers select between two popular imple…
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Includes index and tables
Includes index and tables